An article by Bloomberg and reposted by MSN reports the launch of Russia’s new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) from the Plesetsk cosmodrome in the northern Arkhangelsk Oblast. Putin is quoted in the Bloomberg piece as saying-

“this unique weapon will strengthen the military potential of our armed forces, will reliably guarantee Russia’s security against outside threats and force those, who in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric try to threaten our country, to think again.”

Can we take it that the stated uniqueness of this weapon is related to it’s ability to evade whatever antiballistic missile capability the west may have? Or perhaps Sarmat may have greater range or more numerous and more accurate MIRVs? Whatever the case may be, Putin is ratcheting up the tension and uncertainty with regard to his dedication to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), making us wonder about his unleashing a pre-emptive nuclear strike.

There has been much speculation on what could trigger Putin’s use of tactical nuclear weapons. Informed opinion can be found in The Congressional Research Office document, updated in March of 2022, titled “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization.”

This document states that in a 2018 speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin said-

“I should note that our military doctrine says Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons solely in response to a nuclear attack, or an attack with other weapons of mass destruction against the country or its allies, or an act of aggression against us with the use of conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state. This all is very clear and specific. As such, I see it is my duty to announce the following. Any use of nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of short, medium or any range at all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will be immediate, with all the attendant consequences. There should be no doubt about this whatsoever.”

“There is no provision for a preventive strike in our nuclear weapons doctrine. Our concept is based on a retaliatory reciprocal counter strike. This means that we are prepared and will use nuclear weapons only when we know for certain that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory [with nuclear weapons]…. Only when we know for certain—and this takes a few seconds to understand—that Russia is being attacked will we deliver a counterstrike…. Of course, this amounts to a global catastrophe, but I would like to repeat that we cannot be the initiators of such a catastrophe because we have no provision for a preventive strike.”

While Putin says that Russia cannot be the initiators of a catastrophe, which could be taken as a nuclear exchange, Russia does reserve the right to a nuclear response to the use of conventional weapons that threaten the existence of the state. This suggests that a first use of nuclear weapons is possible by Russia. So, what circumstance would Russia have to be presented with to view a threat as existential? The death of Putin or the collapse of his government? A NATO invasion rolling onto Russian soil? Moscow surrounded by NATO tanks? Or just a moment of panic by Putin? One thing seems certain- Putin will be the judge of what is existential.

Elsewhere in the report it is stated that “… several [US] analysts have argued that Russia has adopted an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine. They contend that when faced with the likelihood of defeat in a military conflict with NATO, Russia might threaten to use nuclear weapons in an effort to coerce NATO members to withdraw from the battlefield.”

This escalate to de-escalate idea from 2018 looks familiar. Maybe this is what Putin is doing now.

A summary of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne, and Bradley H. Roberts, “Continuity and Change U.S. Nuclear Policy,” RealClear Defense, February 7, 2018. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/02/07/continuity_and_change_in_us_nuclear_policy_113025.html

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