The electronic news world is a colossal hodgepodge of media jumping on anything new and “compelling”. The weekend’s compelling news du jour is Ret. Adm. Mike Mullen‘s comments on the likelihood of nuclear war with North Korea (DPRK). As a retired admiral and chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Mullen is a strategic thinker. These days he is very pessimistic of the US finding a peaceful way forward with the DPRK.
Taken alone, this view could be ignored as an outlier. But against a backdrop of other seemingly credible reports, Mullen’s worry could be taken as another indicator of the tempo of concern within much of DC. Consistent with Mullen’s worry is a lengthy 12/14/17 interview with Senator Lindsey Graham written by Uri Friedman at The Atlantic. Graham is an opinion leader on the matter of the DPRK. The article is well written and I must highly recommend it.
The frothy part of this DPRK boil-up is talk of nuclear conflict. The language that I have heard does not distinguish the various scenarios of how a nuclear war would unfold on the Korean Peninsula. One thing that was made clear by Graham in the Atlantic article is that there could be no limited strike on the DPRK. I assume it means defensively or otherwise. Any attack on the North, nuclear or conventional, would have to result in the complete collapse of the Kim regime.
The US military develops and refines war plans in preparation for any contingency. But, I’m curious how the psychological impact of the use of nuclear weapons will play in the various war cabinets of the world. After all, the nuclear-bomb genie has been kept in the bottle since August, 1945. Will a first use on or by the DPRK lower the threshold for other nuclear states?
A nuclear weapon married to a missile is a highly engineered machine that is at the apex of multiple military technologies. Expertise and a minimum of infrastructure in metallurgy, nuclear physics, chemistry, propellants, and delivery vehicle technology is necessary for accurate execution of a strike. For the DPRK to maximize the punch of its limited nuclear armaments, a strike relying on accurate delivery of a nuclear war shot to a remote or hardened target would require their leadership to gamble on layers of unproven or unrefined technology. The Kim regime may be a political malignancy, but they are not stupid.
Suppose the DPRK is able to strike some important targets with its nukes. Surely some in the North’s command know the consequences to follow. Decapitation of its leadership and annihilation of its war making capacity are a certainty.
For the US, the use of a nuclear war shot on the DPRK is not an inevitable result of physics like the apple that fell on Newton’s head. A release from the US nuclear arsenal is a choice and thus psychological in both application and long term consequence. Would a US nuclear response to a nuclear strike- anywhere- by the DPRK make sense for the US in the subsequent post-war world?
The last big war, WWII, started conventional and ended nuclear. Since then, the threat of mutual nuclear conflagration has helped to keep the peace by serving as a deterrence. Mutual Assured Destruction, MAD, is credited, superficially a least, with keeping armed conflict a strictly chemical explosives activity. What happens to the ground under the psychological pedestal supporting MAD when a nation-state uses nuclear weapons thinking it could win a conflict? How would the various national policies on first use change across the world and what do the likely outcomes look like?
There are many issues that follow from conflict with the DPRK. I hope that as much energy is given to the diplomatic scene as the theatre of war.




