I was just reviewing a report on the Mayak )(or Kyshtym) criticality accident in September of 1957 near the town of Kyshtym in the Chelyabinsk oblast. The long and short of it is that an aqueous subcritical solution of fissile material, U and Pu, unexpectedly came into contact with an organic extraction solvent on top of the aqueous layer. The U and Pu were extracted into the organic layer and concentrated in the lower volume (my guess) of the organic solvent. This is otherwise a normal operation in the purification of actinides. This resulted in the first of three criticality excursions that day in the mixing vessel. As criticality excursions go there was a flash of Cerenkov radiation and a heat pulse observed by the operators.
I’ll leave it as an exercise for the reader to review the history of Soviet criticality incidents and distribution of radioactive materials into the environment.
The USSR had numerous serious nuclear accidents during it’s time. The most well-known Soviet accident was the Chernobyl disaster, which was also an excursion event, though different from the Mayak accident. The USA did as well, but not to the extent and magnitude as those in the USSR. In the early nuclear-age the Soviets were not shy about discharging radioactive waste into local lakes and rivers.
With this history in mind, one has to wonder about the condition of Russian nuclear weapons as well as their readiness for use within their home-spun fail-safe system. Also, consider their targeting systems. If a single tactical or strategic nuclear weapons release happens to miss its target, will they try again? Would two explosions be set off to get a single target, doubling the fallout problem? This is probably a minor issue on the scale of nuclear conflict but given their heritage of nuclear accidents and the ham-fisted conduct of the current war I have to wonder. In the performance of Russian command and control in the Putin-Ukraine war, my expectations of their handling of nuclear weapons has dropped a few notches.
